Articles Posted in Copyright

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 provides many benefits to copyright holders. Add one more to the list. In Xcentric Ventures LLC v. Karsen Limited et al (2011), the court refused the let the Russian Defendant play hide-and-seek to avoid service of process and authorized the Plaintiff to effect service by email due to a provision in the DMCA.

Plaintiff XCENTRIC VENTURES is the operator of a consumer complaint website. It discovered that a website owned and operated by defendant allegedly contains certain copyrighted material. Pursuant to the DMCA, it sent a series of DMCA take-down notices to non-party Google, Inc. to remove the infringing content from its search index and inform defendant that it is infringing on plaintiff’s copyrights. Google complied. Pursuant to the DMCA, defendant responded by serving a counter-notice on Google to contest the accuracy of the initial notice. To be effective, the counter-notice must contain certain things including: “the subscriber’s name, address, and telephone number, and a statement that the subscriber consents to the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court . . . and that the subscriber will accept service of process from the person who provided notification under subsection (c)(1)(C)
or an agent of such person.” §
512(g)(3)(D).

Plaintiff filed a suit alleging copyright and trademark infringement. See §
512(g)(2)(C) (stating that unless a party files an action seeking a court order to prohibit the infringing activity, the service provider can restore the removed material). Plaintiff attempted to serve defendant a copy of the summons and complaint via Federal Express delivery to the address provided in St.
Petersburg, Russia and via email. Delivery at the Russian address was unsuccessful because the address was “incorrect” according to FedEx.
On June 13, 2011, defendant emailed plaintiff in response to plaintiff’s emailed service of process. Defendant generally objected to the lawsuit and included a response, which it asked plaintiff to file with the court. In a later email correspondence, defendant argued that it never waived service of process and any service must be in compliance with the Hague Service Convention.

Plaintiff moved for an order determining whether it has effectively accomplished service of process on defendant Karsen or for leave to perform alternative service. Defendants did not respond or otherwise appear in the case.

The court found:

It is clear to the court that defendant has notice of the lawsuit and is evading service of process. By filing the counter-notice, defendant expressly agreed to accept service of process at its Russian address. Plaintiff attempted to perform service there but was unsuccessful. Defendant also purports not to understand the English language or the American court system, yet it corresponds sufficiently in English and appears capable of drafting a responsive pleading, as evidenced by the response it emailed plaintiff. Plaintiff has made other diligent, but unsuccessful, efforts to locate an alternative mailing address. In the absence of a correct address, plaintiff cannot personally serve defendant in Russia. It seems the only medium effective at reaching defendant is email.

We cannot, however, find that plaintiff has already accomplished service of process. While defendant did agree to accept service of process when it filed the counter-notice, plaintiff was unsuccessful in serving defendant by conventional means at its Russian address. [*3] Service by alternative methods, such as email, is only effective after court approval. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l. Interlink,
284 F.3d 1007, 1018
(9th Cir. 2002) (stating that email service is not available absent a Fed R.
Civ. P. 4(f)(3)
court decree); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(h)(2)
(authorizing service of process on a foreign business in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(f)).

The court granted plaintiffs leave to serve defendant via email, stating “Service by email in circumstances where the defendant is evading service of process and it is the only method reasonably calculated to appraise defendant of the pendency of the action is permissible. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017 (approving an order granting leave to serve by email under similar circumstances); see also Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v.
Vingay.com, No. CV-11-0280-PHX-LOA, 2011 WL 810250 (D. Ariz. March 3, 2011) (permitting service by email). Moreover,
alternative methods of service in Russia, even those not required under the Hague Service Convention, are permissible, since Russia unilaterally suspended all judicial cooperation with the United States in 2003. See Nuance Commc’ns., Inc. v. Abby Software, 626 F.3d 1222, 1237-38
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a district court erred in requiring service upon a Russian corporation to be in compliance with the Hague Service Convention).
As the Ninth Circuit stated, “when faced with an international e-business scofflaw, playing hide-and-seek with the federal court, email may be the only means of effecting service of process.” Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018.

A federal court dismissed on summary judgment most of the copyright infringement claims against Google, ruling, in part, that Plaintiff’s notices were not compliant with the requirements of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). As a result, the court found that Google was entitled to “safe harbor” protection under various sections of the DMCA.

This is another in a string of DMCA rulings that favor online service providers, place the burden of policing infringement on content owners and demonstrate the courts’ inclination to strictly construe the DMCA requirements. We previously posted about the $1 billion damage claim that Google (and its YouTube subsidiary) avoided in its lawsuit with Viacom by reliance on the DMCA. These cases continue to highlight the business need for ensuring that companies have and comply with effective DMCA policies.

In framing some of the issues, the court stated:

In order to be eligible for any of these three safe harbors under the DMCA, a party must satisfy three threshold conditions. First, the party must be a service provider as defined under 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). Second, the party must have “adopted and reasonably implemented, and inform[] subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1). Third, the party must “accommodate[] and . . . not interfere with standard technical measures” used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(i)(1)-(2).

The court found that Perfect 10 did not dispute that Google met the first and third prongs, but rather it argued that there were issues about whether Google implemented a suitable policy for repeat infringers. But for some of the technologies at issue (e.g., Google’s Web Search, Image Search and caching feature”), Google does not have account holders or subscribers. Even Perfect 10 did not contend that Google must, or even can, have a repeat infringer policy for those services. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (requiring a repeat infringer policy for those services with “subscribers and account holders”). Thus, the court summarily found in Google’s favor on these issues.

The court also addressed issues relating to the “Information Location Tools” safe harbor under Section 512(d) of the DMCA. Here the court found that Google, in many cases, did not have “actual notice” of infringement, despite receiving numerous notices from Perfect 10. The court stated:

As the Ninth Circuit explained in CCBill, “The DMCA notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright infringement–identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately documenting infringement–squarely on the owners of the copyright.” CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1113. P10’s Group C notices do not “identif[y] . . . the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). To refer Google to more than 15,000 images appearing on the entirety of P10’s website falls far short of identifying what may have been infringed. Nor is a reference to the totality of the P10 image collection “a representative list” of “multiple copyrighted works” appearing without authorization at a single infringing site. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). Thus, all of P10’s Group C notices lack the identification of the copyrighted work required by section 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).

P10’s Group C notices are additionally defective because they do not contain all of the required information in a single written communication.

The court also addressed the Safe Harbor for caching under Section 512(b) of the DMCA and various other issues.

The case is Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc. Here is a  copy of the Decision

On July 23, 2010, Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California entered an order denying Facebook Inc.’s motion to dismiss a second amended complaint alleging that Facebook is guilty of contributing to the copyright infringement of a video game. Judge Alsup denied Facebook’s argument that, as the Plaintiff had failed to properly allege direct infringement by its Co-Defendant, no claim against Facebook for contributory infringement could be made. A copy of the decision can be found here: Miller v Facebook

Background

The pleadings allege that Plaintiff, Daniel Miller, created the video game Boomshine in 2007 and was granted a copyright registration by the U.S. Copyright Office. Boomshine is a game in which players click on floating circles which cause them to expand resulting in the expansion of any other circles which come into contact. Miller’s second amended complaint accuses Defendant,Yao Wei Yeo, of direct infringement by arguing a similar “look and feel” between his video game, ChainRxn, and Boomshine but provides no further evidence of copying. According to the allegations in Miller’s filings, “ChainRxn copies the look and feel of Boomshine by incorporating almost every visual element of the game”. Moreover, the second amended complaint accuses Facebook of contributing to the infringement of the video game by allowing Yeo’s game to remain on its website after being notified that it infringed the copyright of Boomshine.  Miller alleges that “[a]fter defendant Yeo published ChainRxn on defendant Facebook’s website, members of the public were deceived regarding the origin of ChainRxn.”

The Court’s Denial

Facebook filed a motion for dismissal of the suit on June 21, 2010. Its argument was founded on the position that, as Miller had not properly first pled direct infringement by Yeo, he could not sustain a claim for contributory infringement by Facebook. The basis for Facebook’s argument was that Miller’s mere allegation that ChainRxn “looks and feels” identical to Boomshine without further proof of copying was insufficient to allege direct copyright infringement of Boomshine’s source code. Moreover, Facebook argued that the copyright registration Miller had obtained for the source code was limited to its literal elements and not audiovisual elements of Boomshine. Judge Alsup denied the first element of Facebook’s motion as premature noting that a “plaintiff can rarely examine the underlying source code of an accused infringing software program without resorting to discovery.” Specifically, Judge Alsup said it would be “unreasonable, if not impossible” for Miller to know with “exacting detail” how Yeo copied the Boomshine source code so early in the case. Additionally, Judge Alsup denied the second portion of Facebook’s motion by clarifying that the Court’s earlier order “did not hold that copyright protection for source code was limited to the literal elements of the work” but rather that “plaintiff’s copyright appears to be limited to the source code rather than the audiovisual aspects” and further determination is necessary to decide if the audiovisual elements of the game were also protected.

Finally, the court reminded Miller to address the disputed service of the second amended complaint on Yeo by the July 30, 2010 deadline or suffer a “potentially fatal defect” to his case.

Comments

The above action is interesting for several reasons. Platform companies like Facebook generally rely on the “safe harbor” protections the Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides when an infringement claim is made for the postings of a third-party. In fact,YouTube recently obtained a favorable decision providing it with DMCA protection in a potentially billion-dollar copyright infringement suit brought by Viacom. Moreover, while the Courts may differ on copyright protection for audiovisual “screen displays” in video games, the Copyright office’s consistent position is that “a single registration is sufficient to protect the copyright in a computer program and related screen displays, including videogames, without a separate registration for the screen displays or a specific reference to them on the application for the computer program.” For further discussion you can review the Copyright office’s Circular 61

That said, this case continues to demonstrate that social networking platforms and other websites displaying user generated content must be ever vigilant or potentially face suits arguing various copyright theories. As technology advances (as well as the means of infringement) it is likely the pleading requirements will remain relatively low and defer the need to demonstrate the how, when and why of the alleged infringement until the completion of discovery. Since this will likely increase the cost of litigating these matters, Platform operators and creators of user generated content need to understand and avail themselves of copyright (and other IP) protection, enforcement techniques and available defenses.